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Social Explanatory Style as a Foundation of Social Orientation 
Michael R. Andreychik 
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 The present work examines the notion that people’s social explanations—the explanatory 
frameworks they use to make sense of others’ behaviors and outcomes—are intimately tied to 
their social orientation, or the extent to which they demonstrate tendencies such as empathy, 
forgiveness, and a rejection of punitiveness. More specifically, the central argument of the 
present work is that social explanations can vary along a number of dimensions, and where a 
person’s explanations characteristically fall on these dimensions has important implications for 
her social emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. This claim is analogous to the claim underlying 
work on explanatory style (Buchanan & Seligman, 1995), which suggests that the manner in 
which one characteristically explains one’s own behavior and outcomes is related to one’s 
orientation toward the self (e.g., depression). While evidence for our proposed link between 
social explanations and social orientations is suggested by existing work (Gill & Andreychik, 
2006; Weiner, 2006; Gill & Andreychik, 2007), that work differs from the present approach 
either by focusing on orientations toward particular social groups (rather than general social 
orientations) or by focusing on the situational manipulability of social explanations (rather than 
the idea that people have characteristic styles of explanation). 
 At a broader level, we are interested in contributing to knowledge regarding the multiple 
bases of prosocial orientations (see Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). Existing work 
has demonstrated that prosocial orientations can stem from sources such as spontaneous affective 
reactions to others (e.g., Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990), parental modeling of prosocial 
behaviors (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1992), quality of mother-child attachment (e.g., Kestenbaum, 
Farber, & Stroufe, 1989), and styles of reasoning with children about moral and social situations 
(e.g., Hoffman, 2001). Importantly, we want to contribute to that body of knowledge by 
emphasizing the role of social explanatory style in fostering prosocial tendencies.  
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 Because the seeds of our ideas regarding explanations and social orientation were planted 
during our research on the basis of intergroup attitudes, we must begin with a review of relevant 
intergroup literature to construct the rationale for the present work.  
Internal Explanations and Negative Intergroup Attitudes 
The starting point of our approach is the long tradition of scholars who have studied 
intergroup attitudes; a tradition that has offered many views regarding the origins of such 
attitudes. It has been suggested that intergroup attitudes may stem from sources as diverse as 
group-image maintenance (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), conflict over tangible resources (Sherif, 
1966), attempts to maintain or restore equity in social relationships (Adams, 1963; Lerner, 1980), 
and socialization processes that are devoid of intergroup contact (Allport, 1954). Scholars have 
also advanced other “purposes” of intergroup attitudes, and especially stereotypes, such as the 
release of repressed hostilities (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) and 
cognitive efficiency (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994).  
Most germane for the present analysis, however, are approaches that have emphasized the 
role played by the human proclivity for constructing explanations (e.g. Allport, 1954; Hoffman 
& Hurst, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Yzerbyt & Rocher, 2002). Such 
work underscores a view of explanation as a fundamental human activity (e.g., Gopnik, 2000; 
Heider, 1958; Fiske, 2004) that enables us to better understand our environment (Kelley, 1971; 
White, 1959) thereby enhancing the efficacy of future behavior (Weiner, 1983) and the 
subjective sense of cognitive mastery (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986). Indeed, the ubiquity of 
explanation suggests that it may be critically important for the coordination and effectiveness of 
nearly all complex human social activity (Malle, 2004).  
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 One possible outcome of this pervasive explanatory tendency, according to scholars who 
study intergroup attitudes, is the creation of negative or stereotypic attitudes. Hoffman and Hurst 
(1990) were among the first to suggest this. They presented participants with information about 
the traits and social roles of individual members of two fictional groups, the “Orinthians” and the 
“Ackmians.” The two groups were constructed so that they possessed an equal number of 
communal (e.g., caring, compassionate) and agentic (e.g., assertive, decisive) traits (averaged 
across group members). One group however, was composed of 80% “city workers” and 20% 
“child raisers” (male-analogue), and the other group was composed of 80% “child raisers” and 
20% “city workers” (female-analogue). Although both groups had the same number of 
communal and agentic traits, participants judged the male-analogue category as more agentic and 
the female-analogue category as more communal. Consistent with the idea that these stereotypes 
were created as explanations, stereotypes were of greater magnitude when participants had been 
explicitly asked to explain why the members of the groups occupied different social roles.  
 Jost and Banaji (1994) further examine the role of explanations in their system 
justification theory. This theory maintains that although social systems produce patterns of 
disparities among groups, such disparities do not result in an inordinate amount of discontent 
because people (including those who suffer most from such disparities) want to believe that their 
society is a fair one. In the service of upholding this belief, macro-level patterns of disparity are 
explained in terms of deficiencies of the low-status groups (e.g. they’re lazy) or virtues of the 
high-status groups (e.g., they’re intelligent), with negative attitudes toward low status groups 
emerging as a result of these “system-justifying” explanations.  
Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) presents a different but related 
argument, focusing instead on the idea that humans have an evolved preference for group 
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hierarchy (rather than a desire to view society as fair). Such hierarchy necessarily creates 
inequality, but the inequality thus engendered is met with relative approval because the 
hierarchical systems themselves are supported by legitimizing myths which serve to explain and 
justify them. Such legitimizing myths often involve the creation of stereotypes that explain the 
inequality that exists in the social system as stemming from inherent differences between groups. 
For instance, as with system-justification theory, such justifications might take the form of 
locating the causes of African American poverty in the inherent laziness or inferiority of African 
Americans.  
 All of this work presents a clear message: negative orientations toward a group—
prejudice, antagonism—are created when people observe broad patterns of group difference and 
then explain those differences using an internal explanation, or an explanation focused on 
qualities ostensibly possessed by group members (e.g., traits, attitudes, abilities). While we agree 
with the idea that internal explanations play an important role in shaping social attitudes, we also 
believe that the theories just discussed are limited by the fact that they concentrate exclusively on 
one type of causal explanation (i.e., internal explanations).  
Our departure point, then, is with the observation that work on lay behavior explanations 
has highlighted a rich conceptual repertoire that human beings have at their disposal when they 
explain behavior (e.g., Dweck, 1999; Gilbert, 1998; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972; Weiner, 1986). 
Our goal with the present study is to broaden the scope of the types of explanations that are 
investigated and linked to social attitudes and, consequently, to examine not just the basis of 
negative social orientations but the basis of positive social orientations (e.g., empathy, 
compassion) as well. Also, we will broaden the focus from attitudes toward particular groups to 
more general social orientations: Empathy, forgiveness, and punitiveness as dispositions.  
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Three Fundamental Dimensions of Lay Social Explanations 
Heider’s Internal/External Distinction 
Heider (1958) is credited with introducing what has become the best-known distinction 
with respect to lay behavior explanations: Internal (“something about the person”) versus 
external (“something about the situation”) explanations (cf. Malle, 2004). This distinction 
became the focal point of Kelley’s classic (1972) ANOVA model, which sought to describe the 
reasoning procedures that perceivers use to choose between internal or external causes. Indeed, 
the internal-external distinction has underlain a wealth of research in the field (see Buchanan & 
Seligman, 1995; Gilbert, 1998; Weiner, 1986; 2006, for reviews).  
Ross (1977), however, highlighted some conceptual ambiguities with the 
internal/external distinction. In particular, he noted that “causal statements which explicitly cite 
situational causes implicitly convey something about the actor’s dispositions; conversely, 
statements which cite dispositional causes invariably imply the existence and controlling 
influence of situational factors” (pg. 176). For example, if Joe buys Jane flowers because of the 
situational fact that “Jane was upset at him,” this also implies that Joe has a disposition to try to 
improve his relationships when they go awry. And, if Joe buys Jane flowers because “he likes to 
cheer people up,” this also implies that there was someone in his situation who needed cheering 
up and thus is a relevant cause of the flower buying. So, looking at the surface content of what 
people say when making their attributions (i.e., whether they explicitly focus on the person or the 
situation) seems to provide a weak basis for distinguishing internal from external attributions. 
How, then, can we distinguish them? Ross suggests—and Gilbert (1998) makes precisely the 
same suggestion—that internal attributions are those implying an actor has dispositions that are 
atypical and that distinguish him from other actors (“Joe is more likely to try to cheer people up 
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than is the average person”) and external attributions imply that an actor has dispositions that are 
typical for people in general (“anyone would have bought flowers in the situation Joe was in”).  
It is clear from our review above that internal explanations have received much attention 
in the literature on intergroup attitudes. External explanations, however, have received much less 
attention. In fact, much of the work reviewed conceives of intergroup attitudes as being 
uniformly based on internal explanations, with no attention paid to possible diversity in social 
explanations (e.g., Hoffmann & Hurst, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
Other work does recognize diversity in social explanations, but conceives of that diversity in 
terms of gradations in essentialism—the extent to which group characteristics are perceived as 
stemming from a group’s “inherent nature”—(e.g., Haslam et al., 2000, 2002; Keller, 2005; 
Yzerbyt & Buidin, 1998). Indeed, none of this work acknowledges the existence of external 
explanations. Nevertheless, other researchers have highlighted the fact that both internal and 
external explanatory frameworks show up in people’s reasoning about social groups and that, 
moreover, educational interventions can shift an individual’s manner of explaining from internal 
to external (e.g., Guimond, Begin, & Palmer, 1989; Lopez, Gurin, & Nagda, 1998; Gill & 
Andreychik, 2006).  
Weiner’s Stable/Unstable and Controllable/Uncontrollable Distinctions 
During the infancy of empirical work on lay explanations, Weiner created a research 
program the results of which suggested that the internal-external dichotomy so familiar to 
attribution theorists since Heider (1958) did not capture all of the meaningful differences that 
exist among lay explanations (Weiner et al., 1971). Weiner posited that among internal causes, 
there exist degrees of stability such that internal causes may be further classified as either stable 
(e.g., aptitude) or unstable (e.g., temporary effort). This same distinction can be applied to 
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external causes as well, resulting in external-stable causes (e.g., objective task difficulty), and 
external-unstable causes (e.g., chance). This scheme was further expanded in 1979 when Weiner 
added a third dimension of causality, controllability (Weiner, 1979). This final dimension 
captured the fact that within each of the four cells of the previous classification scheme, another 
property existed that could be used to describe the already classified causes. This dimension was 
characterized as discerning factors that are “controllable by anyone” from factors that are “not 
controllable by anyone.” These dimensions have received much attention in work on 
achievement motivation (Weiner, 1986). Furthermore, the dimension of controllability has 
received attention with regard to its role in fostering social emotions such as sympathy and anger 
(see Weiner, 2006 for a review). That work will be reviewed below. 
What is Social Orientation? 
 Having outlined a number of dimensions on which explanations may differ, we now turn 
to an examination of what we mean by social orientation. Toward that end, we will provide a 
brief overview of conceptual and empirical work on the core social orientation variables of 
empathy, compassion, and forgiveness.  
 In our view, two key aspects of social orientation are the tightly interrelated phenomena 
of empathy and compassion. In the social psychological literature, empathy is a more ubiquitous 
label and phenomenon of study, so we will begin there. In a recent review, Batson, Ahmad, 
Lishner, and Tsang (2002) defined empathy as “an other-oriented emotional response elicited by 
and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone else” (pg. 486). When people experience 
empathy, they become more likely engage in behavior aimed at alleviating the suffering or 
improving the welfare of others (see Batson, 1991 for a review). Additionally, the experience of 
empathy with respect to a particular member of a social group has also been shown to improve 
  9
feelings toward the entire group (Batson et al., 1997). Researchers have also shown that the 
robust relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior does not seem to spring from any 
“egoistic” motivation of perceivers (Batson, 1981; Batson et al., 1988; Batson et al., 1989; Toi & 
Batson, 1982; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986).  
 Whereas the approach of Batson and his colleagues has been to study empathy as a 
situationally-elicited emotion, our approach is to conceive of empathy as a general social 
orientation: That is, some individuals are more prone to experience empathy across different 
contexts and targets than are others. We are not alone, of course, in this approach. Indeed, the 
influential work of Davis (1996) has focused on the measurement of empathy as an individual 
difference variable. Reviews of the literature on dispositional empathy and social behavior 
suggest that, in fact, there are stable individual differences in empathy and these differences are 
predictive of prosocial behavior (see Davis, 1996; Eisenberg, Guthrie, Cumberland, Murphy, 
Shepard, Zhou, & Carlo, 2002; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, for reviews).   
 The concept of compassion is closely related to empathy. Cassell (2002) describes 
compassion in terms of the feelings of pity, sadness, sympathy, or indignation that one 
experiences in response to the sufferings or injustices endured by another. He also provides the 
basic requirements for compassion: “First, we must feel that the troubles that evoke our feelings 
are serious; second, we require the sufferers’ troubles not be self-inflicted—they must be the 
result of an unjust fate; finally, it is believed that for compassion to be evoked, we must be able 
to picture ourselves in the same predicament.” Compassion as defined here depends on feeling a 
sense of connection with others—a sense that “we are the same” or that we might someday 
experience suffering similar to that of others—a propensity that humans notably possess from 
soon after birth (e.g., Meltzoff, 1985; Meltzoff & Kuhl, 1989). Much as compassion is posited to 
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result from connection, a lack of compassion is thought to result from a disconnecting with 
others—indeed, history is filled with examples of the objectification of enemies, of adopting a 
view that they are “not like us”. Cassell’s approach is theoretical and not empirical, so what 
emerges from his work is a picture of compassion and its necessary preconditions, but little 
evidence regarding what compassion “does” for those who evoke it. Granting that compassion is 
perhaps another label for Batson’s “other-oriented emotion,” the literature reviews cited above 
support the importance of compassion as a motivator of prosocial behavior. Below, we will 
simply use the term empathy to refer to the class of other-oriented emotional responses referred 
to by the labels empathy or compassion in the literature.  
 An additional element of social orientation that we will discuss is forgiveness. As with 
empathy, forgiveness can be thought of in both situational terms (e.g., the forgiving of a 
particular transgression) and in dispositional terms (e.g., a general propensity to forgive). 
McCullough and Witvliet offer the following definitions: “As a response, forgiveness may be 
understood as a prosocial change in a victim’s thoughts, emotions, and/or behaviors toward a 
blameworthy transgressor…As a personality disposition, forgiveness may be understood as a 
propensity to forgive others across a wide variety of interpersonal circumstances.” (Pg. 447). 
Supporting the idea that forgiveness is a component of a general social orientation, those with 
dispositional tendencies toward forgiving have been shown to be higher in empathy (Tangney et 
al., 1999) and to endorse more socially desirable attitudes and behavior (Mauger et al., 1992). 
Regarding situational determinants of forgiveness, research has also shown that forgiveness is 
more difficult for transgressions that are severe and/or intentional (Boon & Sulsky, 1997). 
Forgiveness is also fostered by forgiveness-seeking and apologetic behavior on the part of 
transgressors (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Girard & Mullet, 1997), and is more likely in 
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relationships that are satisfying, close, and committed (e.g., Nelson, 1993; Rackley, 1993). 
Because empathy, compassion, and forgiveness are related both conceptually and empirically, 
we will use the label social orientation to refer to this cluster of phenomena.  
Rationale for Expecting Links between Social Explanations and Social Orientation 
Now that we have provided some sense of what me mean by social orientation, we will 
provide some rationale for expecting social explanations to be associated with social orientation. 
The basis of our rationale will be two-fold: To some extent, the rationale will be based on our 
reasoning from the conceptualizations described above; furthermore, our rationale will be rooted 
in numerous findings presented in the literature.  
Internality/Externality and Social Orientation 
Why would social orientation be linked to the internality/externality of explanations? 
Weiner (2006) advances the metaphors of ‘person as judge’ and ‘life as a courtroom’ to offer us 
a possible explanation. For Weiner, it is the task of the social perceiver to assess the 
responsibility of someone whose action or outcome he observes. When a target is judged 
responsible, this implies that the target caused the outcome in question and is morally 
accountable in the sense of deserving blame/praise or punishment/reward (Weiner, 2006). 
Importantly, Weiner highlights the role of explanations in determining assessments of 
responsibility. While he concentrates primarily on the causal dimension of controllability, it 
seems likely that internality/externality may function in much the same way as controllability in 
affecting responsibility assessements. Specifically, Weiner states that outcomes or behaviors 
seen as controllable will result in greater perceived responsibility than will outcomes or 
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behaviors seen as uncontrollable1. Similarly, it seems likely that outcomes or behaviors that are 
seen as stemming from internal qualities of the actor will likewise result in greater perceived 
responsibility (e.g., “It’s her own fault; she just won’t apply herself”) than will outcomes or 
behaviors seen as stemming from forces external to the actor (e.g., “The schools in her 
neighborhood are terrible; they just didn’t provide her with the skills she needs to succeed”). The 
underlying psychological principle here could be stated thusly: When people perceive an effect 
(e.g., behavior, outcome), they search for the cause of that effect; consequent cognitions, affects, 
and behaviors are directed toward the perceived cause.  
A similar rationale for expecting a link between internality/externality and social 
orientation can be deduced from Cassell’s second requirement for compassion: That compassion 
depends on perceiving a sufferers’ troubles as not self-inflicted. To illustrate, consider the 
following example offered by Cassell. A subway motorman in New York City was interviewed 
regarding three people who were run over by his train. In discussing the first two of these 
incidents, the motorman offered the following explanation: “It was their own fault, you might 
even say foolishness, that landed them on the tracks in the first place. One man was drunk. The 
other fellow turned out to have been on drugs.” In discussing the third of these incidents, in 
which the motorman hit two repairmen working on the tracks, he offered this statement: “The 
look on their faces; it was like looking into a mask of horror.” In explaining the motorman’s very 
different reactions to the plight of these individuals, Cassell points to the fact that compassion 
was felt for the repairmen but not for the first two men because in the eyes of the motorman the 
fate of the first two victims was self-inflicted.  
                                                 
1 A more detailed discussion of links between controllability and social orientation is provided in the following 
section. 
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We of course cannot dispute the feelings of the motorman, but we can note that there is 
nothing in the nature of the incidents themselves or the “objective” facts of the situation that 
leads us inexorably to the same conclusion that the motorman reached. Put differently, the reason 
that the fate of an inebriated man was not met with empathy was because of the way the 
motorman explained the inebriated man’s presence on the tracks. By saying that he was 
foolish—an internal explanation—his fate became self-inflicted and empathy was not felt. It is 
completely conceivable, however, that his presence on the tracks could have been explained 
using a more external explanation: Perhaps he had turned to drinking after his child’s accidental 
death. In this case, the cruel fate was not self-inflicted but rather seems more indicative of “what 
might happen to any person under the circumstances,” and so would be met with feelings of 
empathy. Importantly, this interpretation of Cassell’s argument seems quite similar to Weiner’s, 
in that explanations are the basis of judgments of what is deserved and what is undeserved (i.e., 
judgments of responsibility), and it is these judgments of deservingness that serve to determine 
the reaction a social perceiver will have toward an actor. In sum, the work of both Weiner and 
Cassell suggests that explanations affect the degree to which actors are seen as responsible for 
their actions and outcomes, and these assessments of responsibility influence social orientations 
toward those actors. Additionally, the degree of internality/externality associated with an 
explanation seems likely to affect the degree to which an actor is seen as responsible for an 
action or outcome.  
 Work from our lab is consistent with this idea (Gill & Andreychik, 2007). Across two 
studies, one based on the should-would paradigm of Devine, Monetith, Zuwerink, & Elliott 
(1991) and another utilizing a novel paradigm that involved getting participants to admit they 
would discriminate against Black males, we found that individuals who endorsed external 
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explanations for the social ills of African Americans reported greater levels of compunction (e.g., 
shame, anger at self) in response to their own prejudicial responses to African Americans than 
did individuals who rejected external explanations. If one grants that the experience of 
compunction indicates that one feels empathy for African Americans (e.g., compunction occurs 
because one’s biases are incompatible with her empathetic orientation), then these data support a 
relation between external explanations and positive social orientation.  
Additional work from our lab (Gill & Andreychik, 2006) examined people’s open-ended 
explanations for the low SES of African Americans, for the violence and hatred of terrorists, and 
for the association with child-rearing of women. Across these target groups, external 
explanations were associated with more positive orientations toward the group than were internal 
explanations. That is, external explainers were particularly likely to embrace diversity as an 
important social goal, to have misgivings about killing terrorists as a solution to terrorism, and to 
be supportive of women’s efforts to attain economic and social parity with men. All these 
findings can be interpreted, we think, in terms of people having more positive social orientations 
toward groups that are understood as possessing statuses and action tendencies that have been 
significantly shaped by external factors.   
Finally, of course, all the literature on internal explanations and prejudice cited at the 
beginning of this paper (e.g., Hoffmann & Hurst, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999) is consistent with the proposed linkage between internality/externality and social 
orientation. All that work points to the idea that people have more negative orientations toward 
targets whose status or action tendencies are perceived as rooted in factors internal to those 
targets.  
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In sum, there are strong reasons to suggest that internality is associated with negative 
social orientations and externality with positive social orientations. All the relevant evidence, 
however, concerns explanations and orientations toward particular groups and does not concern 
the present hypothesis that a general tendency toward internality or externality of explanation—
across targets and contexts—is associated with a more general social orientation.  
Controllability, Intentionality, and Social Orientation 
Weiner’s work focuses on explanations and social orientations far more explicitly than 
does that of most other attribution theorists, who tend to focus on attributions as endpoints rather 
than as contributors to subsequent emotional and cognitive responses. Instead of viewing social 
orientations as rooted in internality/externality, however, Weiner’s work has focused on 
controllability. As already noted, controllability, in our view, may function much like 
internality/externality: It is a dimension with strong implications for whether a status or action is 
interpreted as self-inflicted. Weiner, Graham, and Chandler (1982) had participants read a story 
about a target who engaged in negative behavior. They systematically varied the perceived 
causes of the target’s behavior (e.g., internal-stable-controllable; external-unstable-
uncontrollable) and had participants indicate the degree of anger and pity they might feel toward 
the target. They found that internal-stable-uncontrollable causes resulted in the greatest levels of 
pity (relatively positive orientation toward target), and internal-stable-controllable causes 
resulted in the greatest levels of anger (relatively negative orientation toward target). Judgments 
of controllability have been found to similarly influence the emotional reactions perceivers have 
to the outcomes of specific target groups including the obese (DeJong, 1980) and alcoholics 
(Weiner, 1980a). Across all this work, the implication is that when negative outcomes and 
actions are interpreted as rooted in deliberation and choice (controllable), negative orientations 
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toward targets will predominate. Although clearly relevant to the present hypothesis, this work 
has examined explanations and orientations toward particular individuals (or, occasionally, 
groups) rather than more general social explanatory styles and general social orientations.   
Stability/Instability and Social Orientation 
 Unlike the dimensions of internality/externality, controllability/uncontrollability, and 
intentionality, there is little conceptual or empirical work linking stability with anything that 
might be labeled social orientation. Rather, most work on stability focuses on more cognitive 
outcomes. For example, Weiner (1986) reports substantial evidence that outcomes attributed to 
stable causes are expected to recur. While judgments of stability might not directly contribute to 
social orientations, we suspect that they might serve to amplify the emotions engendered by 
other features of one’s attributions: For example, attributing African American social ills to 
never-ending societal prejudice might engender more anger than attributing those social ills to 
societal prejudice that is seen as on the wane. Perhaps the strongest evidence suggesting that 
stability might interact with other factors to produce emotional responses comes from the 
literature on depressive attributional style (Buchanan & Seligman, 1995). That literature suggests 
that depression is heightened when one makes internal-stable rather than internal-unstable 
attributions for one’s negative outcomes.   
The Present Study 
We have outlined a rationale for expecting links between social explanations and social 
orientation. Specifically, we have highlighted the importance of explanations in determining the 
extent to which actors are considered responsible for their actions and outcomes and we have 
cited evidence suggesting a link between explanations and social orientation (e.g., Weiner, 
1980a; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
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Buchanan & Seligman, 1995; Gill & Andreychik, 2006; 2007). While such evidence is limited in 
the sense that it concentrates on orientations toward specific others (e.g., specific social groups, 
the self), we feel that it offers valuable insights regarding the relationship between explanations 
and social orientation. Our goal in the study proposed below is to apply and extend those insights 
to the understanding of general social orientation, or the extent to which an individual is 
generally empathetic and forgiving.  
The careful reader might also notice at this point that much of the evidence we have cited 
linking explanations with social orientation deals with explanations for negative outcomes. It 
seems logical to assume that internal or controllable explanations for negative outcomes will be 
associated with a relatively negative social orientation toward the groups or individuals who 
suffer those outcomes. However, what may be less clear is that internal or controllable 
explanations for positive outcomes will be associated with relatively negative orientations 
toward the groups or individuals associated with those outcomes. Given our concentration on 
social explanatory style, this point becomes important. We reasoned that while much of the work 
linking explanations and social orientation has concentrated on negative outcomes, the same 
relationships may hold between explanations and social orientation for positive outcomes. For 
example, it seems likely that individuals who primarily use internal explanations for both 
negative and positive events will possess a relatively negative general social orientation. This is 
because within an internal explanatory framework, people who achieve negative outcomes don’t 
deserve our empathy, forgiveness, compassion, etc. (e.g., “It’s their own fault they failed!”), and 
people who achieve positive outcomes don’t need our empathy, forgiveness, compassion, etc. 
(e.g., “She’s just such a talented person, she’ll do well no matter what”).  
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 In order to examine the proposed relationships between explanations and social 
orientation, we designed a two-part study. In the pretest phase, participants completed a number 
of measures assessing their social orientation. Several weeks later, we measured participants’ 
general social explanatory style. This was done by soliciting from them 12 free-response 
explanations for the positive and negative behaviors of groups and individuals. Relationships 
between the social orientation variables and the explanations were then assessed. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants who completed both the pretest and the follow-up comprised 52 female and 
50 male undergraduates at Lehigh University. All participants participated as one means of 
fulfilling a requirement of their Introduction to Psychology class.  
Pretest 
 Participants completed a number of questionnaires assessing various aspects of their 
social orientation (e.g., empathy, forgiveness) at a testing session early in the semester. 
Participants completed the pretest in groups of 4-12. A complete version of each of the social 
orientation scales can be found in Appendix A, so we will describe them only briefly here. 
Empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) is designed to measure 
empathy and consists of 28 items constituting four subscales. The four subscales are empathic concern 
(e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”), perspective-taking 
(e.g., “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision”), personal distress 
(e.g., “In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease”), and fantasy (e.g., “I get really 
involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel”). Participants were asked to rate the extent to 
which each item describes them on a scale ranging from 0 (Does not describe me at all) to 4 
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(Describes me very well). A score was computed for each subscale by averaging the responses to the 7 
appropriate items (empathic concern M = 2.63, SD = .581; perspective-taking M = 2.35, SD = .637; 
personal distress M = 1.57, SD = .686; fantasy M = 2.33, SD = .806).  
Punitive/Compassionate Scale. We created the punitive/compassionate scale to assess the 
extent to which individuals favor punitive or compassionate responses to the negative or hurtful 
actions of others. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with each of ten 
items on a scale ranging from 1 (Disagree Strongly) to 6 (Agree Strongly). Five of the items are 
worded so that agreement corresponds to endorsement of punitiveness (e.g., “In response to 
something as horrific as terrorism, anything short of a powerful military response just doesn’t 
make sense to me”) and five items are worded so that agreement corresponds to an endorsement 
of compassion (e.g., “Love and compassion send a strong message to people, and anyone who 
experiences these things will become a better person”). After reverse coding of the punitiveness 
items, responses to the 10 items were averaged to arrive at an overall measure of compassion 
where higher scores indicated greater endorsement of a compassionate response style (M = 3.58, 
SD = .913). 
Forgiveness. Dispositional forgiveness was assessed with the Transgression Narrative 
Test of Forgiveness (TNTF; Berry, Worthington, Parrott III, O’Connor, & Wade, 2001). The 
TNTF assesses the extent to which individuals are likely to forgive others across a range of 
situations. Participants were asked to indicate how they would be likely to respond to each of 
five scenarios on a scale ranging from 1 (Definitely not Forgive) to 5 (Definitely Forgive). An 
example of one of the scenarios is: “Someone you occasionally see in a class has a paper due at 
the end of the week. You have already completed the paper for the class and this person says he 
or she is under a lot of time pressure and asks you to lend him or her your paper for some ideas. 
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You agree, and this person simply retypes the paper and hands it in. The professor recognizes the 
paper, calls both of you to her office, scolds you, and says you are lucky she doesn’t put you both 
on academic probation. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to 
forgive the person who borrowed your paper.” Responses to the five scenarios were averaged to 
provide an overall measure of forgiveness (M = 2.75, SD = .642).  
Philosophies of Human Nature. The revised version of the Philosophies of Human Nature 
scale (PHN; Wrightsman, 1974) is designed to assess whether one views human beings as 
“basically good” or “basically bad.” The scale is composed of 20 items, 10 of which measure the 
belief that people are conventionally good (e.g., “Most people try to apply the Golden Rule, even 
in today’s complex society”), and 10 of which measure cynicism (e.g., “People pretend to care 
more about one another than they really do”). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which 
they agreed with each statement on a scale ranging from 1 (Agree Strongly) to 6 (Disagree 
Strongly). Ratings on the 10 items for each subscale were then averaged to provide overall 
measures of trust (M = 3.60, SD = .578) and cynicism (M = 3.01, SD = .630).  
Additional pretest measures 
We also included several additional measures at the pretest that do not measure social 
orientation. These will enable the test of additional hypotheses involving possible moderator 
variables.  
Attributional Complexity & Need for Cognitive Closure. Importantly, we were interested 
in testing whether links between social explanatory styles with and social orientations are 
moderated by the extent to which people think deeply and carefully about others’ behavior. 
Accordingly, we measured both Attributional Complexity and Need for Cognitive Closure. The 
Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 1986) consists of items designed to measure the 
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complexity of people’s attributional schemata for human behavior (e.g., “I believe it is important 
to analyze and understand our own thinking processes”; “I have thought a lot about the family 
background and personal history of people who are close to me, in order to understand why they 
are the sort of people they are”). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed 
with each of 28 statements on a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
After reverse scoring where necessary, scores on the 28 items were averaged to provide an 
overall measure of attributional complexity (M = 3.15, SD = .721). The Need for Cognitive 
Closure Scale is composed of 48 items that measure the extent to which individuals tolerate 
ambiguity (e.g., “I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention is unclear to me”). 
Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with each item on a scale ranging from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree). After reverse scoring where appropriate, the items 
were averaged to provide an overall measure of the participant’s need for cognitive closure (M = 
3.84, SD = .589). 
As already noted, our intent in measuring these variables was to enable an examination of 
whether links between social explanatory styles with and social orientations are moderated by 
the extent to which people think deeply and carefully about others’ behavior. For Attributional 
Complexity, we reasoned that the predicted links between social explanations and social 
orientation might be stronger for those participants with a relatively high degree of attributional 
complexity. The reason is that while participants high in attributional complexity are likely to 
have come to a particular explanation only after some measure of thoughtful consideration and to 
have traced out the implications of embracing one explanation rather than another, participants 
low in attributional complexity might offer particular explanations “off the top of their heads” 
(e.g., because they have heard such explanations offered by others in the past) without having an 
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appreciation of the implications of embracing such an explanation. For example, explanations 
invoking childhood experiences as determinants of adult action and status predominate in 
modern American culture. While explanations such as these are clearly external (e.g., “He had a 
rough childhood”), participants low in attributional complexity might offer them without actually 
seeing the implication that, when external forces impinge upon an individual, it becomes less 
reasonable to blame or hold responsible that individual. Tracing out such an implication, we 
believe, is likely to require contemplation of a type unlikely to be engaged in by those low in 
attributional complexity.  
In terms of Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC), we reasoned that the predicted links 
between explanations and social orientation might emerge only for those participants with a 
relatively low degree of NFCC. This is because participants high in NFCC might offer the first 
explanation that comes to mind in order to eliminate their uncertainty most quickly. It seems 
possible, for example, that participants high in NFCC may offer the external-sounding 
‘childhood influencing adulthood’ explanations discussed above because such explanations are 
prevalent in contemporary society and offer a ready device for reducing their uncertainty, and 
their tendency to rapidly seize upon such explanations might prevent them—as with those low in 
Attributional Complexity—from spending time tracing out the implications of such explanations.  
Participants low in NFCC, in contrast, might offer their explanations only after a more careful 
consideration of explanatory implications, and therefore should be more likely to show a 
connection between their explanations and social orientations.  
Follow-up 
Several weeks later, participants returned in groups of 1-6 to take part in an ostensibly 
unrelated study. During this follow-up session, they read 12 vignettes about the outcomes and 
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behaviors of both groups and individuals. In order to provide a measure of general social 
explanatory style we varied both the target of the explanation (i.e.., individual or group) and the 
valence of the behavior or outcome being explained (i.e., positive or negative). The vignettes 
were completed by participants in a quasi-random order. A complete version of each of the 
vignettes can be found in Appendix B. 
After reading a consent form describing a study concerning “how people explain others’ 
behavior,” participants learned that they would be explaining the behavior of others and that they 
should provide as much information as they felt was necessary to provide an adequate 
explanation of the behaviors contained in the vignettes. After all of the vignettes had been 
completed, participants completed a demographic information sheet, and the experimenter 
stapled all the vignettes and the information sheets together. All participants were debriefed upon 
completion of the vignettes task2. 
Results 
Coding Explanations  
                                                 
2 Participants also received one of two further instructions based on whether they had been randomly assigned to the 
self-paced or the experimenter-paced condition. Self-paced participants were instructed to complete the packets at 
their own pace. Experimenter-paced participants were told that they had 3 minutes to provide an explanation for 
each vignette. Furthermore, the experimenter kept track of the elapsed time with a timer and gave participants the 
vignettes one at a time to ensure that they could not proceed to another vignette prematurely. We elected to vary this 
factor after reasoning that participants who complete the packets at their own pace might “rush” through the 
explanations, thus providing relatively superficial explanations that are unlikely to predict much of anything. 
Alternatively, though, we also felt that such “off the top of the head” explanations might be very meaningful in 
terms of revealing people’s characteristic thought patterns (i.e., what comes to mind first reveals one’s cognitive 
predispositions more than what one can recruit after applying substantial effort). By a similar logic, we reasoned that 
participants given three minutes to complete each explanation might either provide more thoughtful explanations or 
might “overthink” their explanations and come up with explanations that bear little relation to their “real” 
explanatory tendencies. Notably, however, this factor showed no relations with any of our variables and thus will 
not be discussed further.  
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Our key predictions concerned relations between dimensions of people’s social 
explanations and their social orientations. Accordingly, we began by forming indices of 
externality, controllability, and stability. Two independent raters coded all the explanations on 
these three dimensions on scales ranging from 1 to 5, with endpoints corresponding to each pole 
of the dimension (e.g., a 1 corresponds to an internal, uncontrollable, or unstable explanation). 
(complete coding instructions can be found in Appendix C). The stability dimension will not be 
discussed further because there was very little variation in stability scores: Nearly all the 
explanations offered by participants were coded as very stable, suggesting that participants cited 
stable causal factors in almost all cases. And, of course, a variable with no variability cannot be 
predictive of anything. We examined the inter-rater reliabilities for codings of externality and 
controllability. For externality, 11 of the 12 items had good inter-rater reliability (α > .702), 
while the reliability for the “Buddhist” item was somewhat lower (α = .526). The controllability 
items had generally lower reliabilities, with 5 of the items having inter-rater reliabilities below 
.6. These items were “Missy” (α = .526), “Joseph Cotton” (α = .556), “Alain Locke” (α = .534), 
“Joe Tax” (α = .319), and “Jeanette Rankin” (α = .353). The ratings of the two coders were then 
averaged for each of the 12 vignettes, resulting in 12 indices of externality and 12 indices of 
controllability for each participant.  
Primary Analyses 
Did people show a social explanatory style? An assumption of our approach is that 
individuals have a social explanatory style. That is, we assume that individuals will have 
characteristic tendencies to cite, for example, primarily internal or primarily external causal 
factors across the different vignettes. Accordingly, we examined whether this assumption was 
supported in our data. To do this, we computed reliabilities assessing the extent to which each 
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individual tended to respond consistently across the 12 vignettes in terms of both externality and 
controllability. For externality, the reliability when examining all of the vignettes was α = .675. 
This suggests that participants did show tendencies to respond (somewhat) consistently across 
the vignettes in terms of the degree to which their explanations focused on external or internal 
causal factors.  
We next examined whether participants tended to cite controllable factors to a similar 
extent across their explanations. When examining all of the vignettes, the reliability for 
controllability was α = .494. As noted earlier, our controllability codings for a number of the 
vignettes did not show good inter-rater reliability. Because of this, we repeated our test of 
explanatory style for controllability including only those vignettes for which inter-rater reliability 
had exceeded α = .6. After removing the vignettes that did not meet this criterion from our 
analyses, however, reliabilities remained low (total controllability α = .448). These results 
suggest that participants’ explanations were less consistent in terms of controllability than they 
were in terms of externality3. 
                                                 
3 While our primary interest in examining participants’ explanations was in gauging whether they showed a 
tendency to cite particular causal factors consistently across all types of explanations, we also felt it important to 
identify any possible differences in the consistency of explanations offered for particular subsets of vignettes. To 
address this question, we examined reliabilities separately for the two explanatory dimensions (i.e., externality and 
controllability) for positive, negative, individual, and group vignettes. In terms of externality for valence, the 
reliability for positive vignettes was α = .569, and the reliability for negative vignettes was α = .595. In terms of 
controllability for valence, the reliability for positive vignettes was α = .446, and the reliability for negative vignettes 
was α = .271. In terms of externality for target, the reliability for individual vignettes was α = .574, and the 
reliability for group vignettes was α = .545. In terms of controllability for target, the reliability for individual 
vignettes was α = .229, and the reliability for group vignettes was α = .451.  
Importantly, examining each of the subscales separately did not result in reliabilities for any explanatory 
dimension that were higher than the reliabilities for all the externality or controllability items taken as a whole. This 
suggests that our decision to use the overall externality and controllability ratings in the primary analyses to follow 
was justified. It is also worth noting that the reliabilities for externality are quite consistent across both valence and 
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 Was social explanatory style related to social orientation? A second key aim of our study 
was to examine the relations between externality, controllability, and relevant social orientation 
variables. To do this, we began by factor analyzing the social orientation variables to see if they 
could be sensibly combined into broader constructs (e.g., social emotions, social attitudes, etc.). 
The factor structure that emerged however, did not provide a compelling way to combine the 
measures, so they are treated separately in all the analyses below. We next performed multiple 
regression analyses in which externality, controllability,4 and sex of participant were entered as 
simultaneous predictors of the social orientation variables. The results of these analyses can be 
seen in Table 1. Notably, the effect of sex was significant for all but one variable. Table 2 lists 
the means separately for each sex for all variables on which the effect of sex was significant.  
In contrast to sex, and contrary to our expectations, social explanations had virtually no 
effects in these analyses. One exception was that controllability was a marginal predictor of 
perspective taking such that higher scores on controllability were associated with lower levels of 
perspective taking. Notably, externality did not emerge as a significant predictor in any of these 
analyses. 
 Were relations between social explanatory style and social orientation moderated by 
cognitive style variables? As noted previously, we measured two potential moderators of the 
relation between social explanations and social orientation: Attributional Complexity and Need 
for Cognitive Closure. We first examined the moderating role of Need for Cognitive Closure. 
Neither externality nor controllability showed any significant interactions with NFCC for 
                                                                                                                                                             
target, while the reliabilities for controllability differ by both valence and target. Specifically, the controllability 
reliabilities for negative behaviors and for behaviors of individuals are lower than the reliabilities for positive 
behaviors and for behaviors of groups. 
 The controllability scores used in these and all future analyses include only those vignettes for which inter-rater 
reliability was above α = .6.  
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predicting our social orientation variables (|ts| < 1.705, ns). We next examined the moderating 
role of Attributional Complexity. In these analyses, as in the analyses examining the moderating 
role of NFCC, sex was included whenever it had been a significant predictor in the primary 
analyses described above. The results of these analyses can be seen in Table 3.  
Table 3 omits the Punitiveness/Compassion scale because the only significant effect on 
that measure was the previously reported main effect of sex. Also, the Philosophies of Human 
Nature—Trust scale is omitted because there were no significant effects on that variable (|ts| < 
1.45, ps > .15). To begin, there were several main effects of Attributional Complexity. 
Specifically, all four components of empathy as tapped by the IRI (i.e., Empathic Concern, 
Perspective Taking, Fantasy, and Personal Distress) tended to decrease as attributional 
complexity increased.  In addition, Cynicism as tapped by the Philosophies of Human Nature 
scale tended to increase as Attributional Complexity increased. It thus appears that Attributional 
Complexity tends to lower empathy and increase cynicism.  
In addition to these main effects, Atttributional Complexity was found, as expected, to 
moderate the relations between social explanations and social orientation. To begin, there were 
several moderating effects involving Attributional Complexity and Externality. For the empathic 
concern subscale of the IRI, there was a significant interaction between externality and 
attributional complexity. Following Aiken and West (1991), we conducted simple slope analyses 
to examine the nature of this interaction. As can be seen in Figure 1, these analyses revealed that 
externality was positively related to empathic concern for participants high in attributional 
complexity (t = 2.18, p = .03), but negatively related to empathic concern for participants low in 
attributional complexity (t = -2.4, p = .004).  
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For personal distress, there was again a significant interaction between externality and 
attributional complexity.  As can be seen in Figure 2, simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 
1991) revealed that personal distress was positively related to externality for participants high in 
attributional complexity (t = 1.98, p = .05), such that higher levels of externality were associated 
with higher levels of personal distress. Personal distress was marginally but negatively related to 
externality for participants low in attributional complexity (t = -1.74, p = .08), such that higher 
levels of externality were associated with lower levels of personal distress.  
There was also a single moderating effect of Attributional Complexity involving 
Controllability. That is, for forgiveness, there was a significant interaction between 
controllability and attributional complexity. As can be seen in Figure 3, simple slope analyses 
(Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that forgiveness was positively related to controllability for 
participants low in attributional complexity (t = 2.26, p = .03), such that higher levels of 
controllability were associated with higher levels of forgiveness. The slope of the line relating 
forgiveness to controllability for participants high in attributional complexity did not reach 
significance (t = -1.23, ns).  
Discussion 
The present work examined the idea that people’s social explanations are linked to their 
social orientations. While past work has examined this notion as well, it has concentrated largely 
on explanations for specific behaviors and consequent evaluations of specific targets. In contrast, 
we sought to examine the relations between an individual’s social explanatory style—the 
characteristic manner in which she explains behaviors and outcomes across situations and 
targets—and her general social orientation. Additionally, past work has largely focused on 
specific dimensions of causal explanation (e.g., internality). We sought to examine a greater 
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variety of explanatory dimensions (i.e., internality/externality, controllability, stability) than has 
been addressed in prior work.  
To begin, we did find some evidence for the existence of a social explanatory style. In 
particular, we found that participants tended to offer explanations with similar levels of 
externality, but not controllability, across the 12 vignettes. With regard to links between social 
explanatory style and social orientation, we found no main effects for externality and only one 
main effect for controllability: Controllability was a marginally significant predictor of 
perspective-taking such that as controllability increased, perspective-taking decreased. This lack 
of main effects was unexpected given that past research linking explanations with emotional 
reactions toward both the self (e.g., Buchanan & Seligman, 1995) and others (e.g., Weiner, 1986; 
Gill & Andreychik, 2007) has provided  support for the notion that explanations are important 
determinants of social orientations.  
Importantly, however, a number of interesting interactions between externality and 
attributional complexity, and between controllability and attributional complexity, did emerge. 
Specifically, among those high in attributional complexity, empathic concern and personal 
distress increased as externality of explanations increased, while those low in attributional 
complexity showed the opposite pattern. In addition, among those low in attributional 
complexity, forgiveness increased as controllability of explanations increased. These results 
suggest that while explanations may indeed be importantly linked to social orientation, it may 
not be explanations per se but rather their interaction with other aspects of an individual’s social 
cognitive orientation that drive that link.  
As discussed earlier, one reason for this may be that individuals high in attributional 
complexity offer explanations only after thoughtful consideration of the implications of 
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embracing one particular explanation over another (e.g., to say that someone’s actions were 
caused by external forces means I cannot hold that person accountable). Individuals low in 
attributional complexity, in contrast, might offer a particular explanation without having thought 
about what embracing that explanation means for how one should approach and relate to others. 
Our results suggest that it is only after tracing out the implications of adopting a particular 
explanatory framework that one shows the relationship between explanations and social 
orientation suggested by past work. 
It is also important to note that our data are correlational and thus causality cannot be 
assumed. Importantly, however, a wealth of evidence exists that speaks to the causal influence of 
explanations on both emotional and cognitive reactions to the actions and outcomes of others. 
For example, in the context of a “getting acquainted” experiment, DeJong (1980) varied the 
explanation for an interaction partner’s obesity. When the obesity was portrayed as controllable, 
the overweight individual was liked less and was more likely to be derogated by his interaction 
partner than when the obesity was presented as uncontrollable. In another study, Weiner (1980) 
manipulated the cause of someone falling down in a subway. When the cause was presented as 
controllable (e.g., the person who fell down was drunk), over 25% of participants directed 
negative affect toward the drunk, whereas only 3% of respondents reported such affective 
reactions when the cause was uncontrollable (e.g., illness). Finally, Gill and Andreychik (2006) 
showed that participants who watched a video emphasizing external obstacles to African 
American social progress showed increases in their support of social policies that might benefit 
African Americans relative to participants who did not watch such a video and that this change in 
attitudes was mediated by changes in social explanations.  
The Changing Meaning of Explanations 
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Our findings suggest something potentially important: The meaning of a particular 
explanation is not static. It seems that “the same” explanation may mean something quite 
different to two perceivers, and that its’ meaning is determined at least partially by other 
characteristics of the individual’s social cognitive orientation (such as whether he tends to 
contemplate others’ behaviors deeply). Indeed, external explanations are “good” (i.e., associated 
with positive social orientation) among those with high levels of attributional complexity, yet 
internal explanations are “good” among those with low levels of attributional complexity.  
But what then does an internal explanation mean for someone low in attributional 
complexity? Why are such explanations—presumed by many theorists to be a foundation of 
social prejudice and negative social orientations—associated with positive social orientations for 
those low in attributional complexity? One possibility is that, for those low in complexity, it is 
not actually their explanations that are driving their social orientations (of course, our 
correlational data render this possibility perfectly plausible). Rather, perhaps it is the case that 
low complexity individuals with internal explanatory styles are a particular type of person who 
has high empathy levels due to a factor that is confounded with their (low) attributional 
complexity/(internal) social explanatory style. Indeed, low attributional complexity suggests a 
tendency to not be a deep thinker and, in addition, a tendency to make internal explanations also 
suggests a tendency to not be a deep thinker (e.g., Gilbert, 1998). Thus, the co-occurrence of 
these two tendencies might suggest that an individual is especially unlikely to employ the 
cognitive system very often or very deeply with respect to social judgment tasks. Why would a 
failure to engage the cognitive system often or deeply result in high levels of empathy?  
Perhaps the empathy levels of low complexity/internal explainers are determined by 
cognitively undemanding psychological processes. And, furthermore, such processes might 
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generally be quite powerful (i.e., creating very high levels of empathy). Indeed, our reading of 
the literature suggests that prosocial responses such as empathy can be created via distinct 
processes. One process, which has not been the focus of the present article, involves an 
“automatic” feeling of tenderness brought about by the mere awareness of others’ suffering (see 
Batson, 1991). Owing to their tendency to eschew deep reasoning about human behavior, it 
seems possible that low complexity/internal explainers have empathy levels that are primarily 
determined by such cognitively simple processes. If one assumes that these cognitively simple 
processes tend to create especially high levels of empathy, then one can make sense of the 
finding that low complexity/internal explainers had quite high levels of empathy in the present 
study.  
Importantly, this analysis provides one way to make sense of the high empathy levels 
among low complexity/internal explainers. It is, of course, highly speculative and thus we cannot 
have confidence in its validity. Future research will need to examine whether the pattern found in 
the present study can be replicated and whether, as we suggest, the psychological basis of 
empathy differs systematically between those low versus high in attributional complexity.  
Two Distinct Routes to Prosocial Orientation? 
The preceding discussion has raised the possibility that there are (at least) two distinct 
routes to social orientation. One route, the focus of the present research, involves social 
explanations and reasoning about justice. The other route involves empathy reactions that are 
spontaneously triggered by mind reading, or awareness of another’s mental states and emotions 
(e.g., suffering, anxiety). The distinctness of mind-reading vis-à-vis social explanations comes 
from work showing that empathic responses sometimes paradoxically contradict expectations 
based on a social explanations approach. For example, Batson and his colleagues found that 
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imagining the suffering of members of stigmatized groups improved attitudes toward that group 
even when the suffering of those group members was presented as self inflicted (e.g., a homeless 
man who “decided he was tired of working and quit his job”) (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & 
Shaw, 1995). One interesting possibility raised by this work is that mind reading—awareness of 
the mental states of others, especially, in the present case, suffering—can increase empathy and 
prosocial orientation independent of social explanations. We are currently focusing our research 
efforts on exploring these hypothesized independent routes to prosocial orientation. 
Conclusions 
 Some evidence was found for the existence of a social explanatory style: The 
explanations people offered tend to be relatively consistent across targets and behaviors in terms 
of their externality but not in terms of their controllability. Explanations taken alone were not 
strongly related to social orientation, a surprising finding given the wealth of literature and 
theorizing linking explanations and emotional reactions. However, explanations were found to 
interact with other variables, namely attributional complexity, such that individuals high in 
attributional complexity showed a relationship between explanations and social orientation that 
conformed to the predicted pattern, at least for some dimensions of social orientation. 
 These results suggest that it may not be explanations per se, but rather their combination 
with other aspects of the individual’s social cognitive orientation that are important in 
determining general social orientation. In addition, results showing that attributional complexity 
was associated with lower levels of empathy when taken alone, and that individuals low in 
attributional complexity who endorsed internal explanations show unexpectedly prosocial 
orientations contradicted the hypothesized relations between explanations and social orientation 
and, we speculatively suggest, might point to the existence of a second pathway to social 
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orientation. One possible candidate for this second pathway is mind reading (Batson, 1991). It 
may therefore be the case that explanations are indeed related to social orientation in a manner 
advanced by theorists, but that the relationship holds only for some people. For others, social 
orientation may be the product of mind reading, and may not depend as critically on explanations 
and their consequent implications for personal responsibility. We are currently focusing our 
research efforts on exploring these hypothesized independent routes to prosocial orientation.  
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Table 1 
 
Regression of Outcome Variables on Externality, Controllability, and Gender 
 
 
Outcome Variable  Predictor     β      t    p 
 
Fantasy Subscale of IRI Externality  -.128  -1.201  .233 
    Controllability  .008  .077  .939 
    Sex   -.327  -3.301  .001 *** 
 
Perspective Taking  Externality  -.177  -1.637  .105 
Subscale of IRI  Controllability  -.207  -1.924  .058 * 
    Sex   -.230  -2.291  .024 ** 
 
Empathic Concern  Externality  -.063  -.586  .560 
Subscale of IRI  Controllability  .064  .594  .554 
    Sex   -.290  -2.892  .005 *** 
 
Personal Distress  Externality  .023  .215  .831 
Subscale of IRI  Controllability  .113  1.045  .299 
    Sex   -.285  -2.840  .006 *** 
 
Punitiveness/Compassion Externality  .083  .802  .425 
    Controllability  -.145  -1.415  .161 
    Sex   .383  4.004  <.001 *** 
 
Forgiveness   Externality  -.128  -1.176  .242 
    Controllability  .017  .161  .873 
    Sex   -.310  -3.085  .003 *** 
 
Philosophies of Human Externality  -.051  -.446  .657 
Nature—Trust Subscale Controllability  -.013  -.111  .912 
    Sex   .056  .534  .595 
 
Philosophies of Human Externality  .082  .744  .459 
Nature—Cynicism Subscale Controllability  .127  1.155  .251 
    Sex   -.205  -2.014  .047 ** 
 
 
 
Note. N = 97. 
 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Table 2 
 
Gender means for variables on which the effect of sex was significant when predicting each 
variable from externality, controllability, and sex of participant 
 
 
Outcome Variable    Males  Females 
 
Fantasy Subscale of IRI   2.10  2.56 
 
Perspective Taking    2.34  2.50 
Subscale of IRI 
 
Empathic Concern    2.47  2.83 
Subscale or IRI 
 
Personal Distress    1.36  1.79 
Subscale of IRI 
 
Punitiveness/Compassion   3.87  3.18 
 
Forgiveness     2.55  2.90 
 
Philosophies of Human    2.88  3.17 
Nature—Cynicism Subscale 
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Table 3 
 
Regression of Outcome Variables on Externality, Controllability, Attributional Complexity, 
Gender (Where Appropriate), and All Two Way Interactions 
 
 
Outcome Variable  Predictor     β      t    p 
 
Fantasy Subscale of IRI Externality  -.053  -.525  .601 
     
Controllability  .044  .442  .660 
     
Sex   -.186  -1.953  .054 * 
     
Attributional  
    Complexity  -.443  -4.518  .001 *** 
     
Externality X 
    AttCom  .133  1.342  .183 
     
Controllability X 
    AttCom  -.070  -.676  .501 
     
Sex X AttCom -.021  -.231  .818 
     
Externality X 
    Controllability  .179  1.836  .070 * 
     
Externality X Sex -.124  -1.240  .218 
     
Controllability X Sex -.099  -.924  .358 
 
 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Perspective Taking  Externality  -.127  -1.158  .250 
Subscale of IRI   
Controllability  -.198  -1.824  .072 * 
     
Sex   -.152  -1.483  .142 
     
Attributional  
    Complexity  -.305  -2.885  .005 *** 
     
Externality X AttCom -.010  -.094  .926 
     
Controllability X 
    AttCom  .094  .835  .406 
     
Sex X AttCom .032  .322  .748 
     
Externality X 
    Controllability  .062  .586  .559 
     
Externality X Sex -.058  -.539  .591 
     
Controllability X Sex -.135  -1.165  .247 
 
 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Empathic Concern  Externality  -.058  -.534  .595 
Subscale of IRI   
Controllability  .058  .536  .593 
     
Sex   -.181  -1.776  .079 * 
     
Attributional 
    Complexity  -.286  -2.729  .008 *** 
     
Externality X AttCom .323  3.046  .003 *** 
     
Controllability X 
    AttCom  .059  .531  .597 
     
Sex X AttCom .029  .294  .769 
     
Externality X 
    Controllability  .037  .358  .722 
     
Externality X Sex -.047  -.443  .659 
     
Controllability X Sex -.053  -.459  .647 
 
 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
  40
 
Personal Distress  Externality  .045  .420  .676 
Subscale of IRI   
Controllability  .153  1.432  .156 
     
Sex   -.194  -1.919  .058 * 
     
Attributional 
    Complexity  -.242  -2.322  .023 ** 
     
Externality X AttCom .205  1.947  .055 * 
     
Controllability X 
    AttCom  -.054  -.483  .630 
     
Sex X AttCom -.156  -1.581  .118 
     
Externality X 
    Controllability  .128  1.232  .222 
     
Externality X Sex -.034  -.316  .753 
     
Controllability X Sex -.140  -1.228  .223 
 
 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Forgiveness   Externality  -.126  -1.126  .263 
     
Controllability  .030  .273  .786 
     
Sex   -.250  -2.397  .019 ** 
     
Attributional 
    Complexity  -.149  -1.398  .166 
     
Externality X AttCom .046  .424  .673 
     
Controllability X 
    AttCom  -.272  -2.389  .019 ** 
     
Sex X AttCom -.103  -1.022  .310 
     
Externality X 
    Controllability  .147  1.384  .170 
     
Externality X Sex .109  .989  .326 
     
Controllability X Sex .185  1.574  .119 
 
 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Philosophies of Human Externality  .074  .653  .515 
Nature—Cynicism Subscale  
Controllability  .155  1.367  .175 
     
Sex   -.135  -1.268  .208 
     
Attributional 
    Complexity  -.222  -2.027  .046 ** 
     
Externality X AttCom .049  .441  .660 
     
Controllability X 
    AttCom  -.125  -1.068  .289 
     
Sex X AttCom -.133  -1.282  .203 
     
Externality X 
    Controllability  -.021  -.189  .850 
     
Externality X Sex .092  .815  .418 
     
Controllability X Sex -.035  -.289  .773  
 
 
 
Note. N = 97.  
  
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
  43
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Simple slope analysis revealing that the relation between empathic concern and 
externality is moderated by levels of attributional complexity. As per Aiken and West (1991), 
high level of endorsement is 1 SD above the mean, medium is the mean, and low is 1 SD below 
the mean. 
Figure 2. Simple slope analysis revealing that the relation between personal distress and 
externality is moderated by levels of attributional complexity. As per Aiken and West (1991), 
high level of endorsement is 1 SD above the mean, medium is the mean, and low is 1 SD below 
the mean. 
Figure 3. Simple slope analysis revealing that the relation between forgiveness and 
controllability is moderated by levels of attributional complexity. As per Aiken and West (1991), 
high level of endorsement is 1 SD above the mean, medium is the mean, and low is 1 SD below 
the mean. 
 
 
  44
R
el
at
io
n 
B
et
w
ee
n 
Ex
te
rn
al
ity
 a
nd
 
Em
pa
th
ic
 C
on
ce
rn
 a
t D
iff
er
en
t L
ev
el
s 
of
 A
ttr
ib
ut
io
na
l C
om
pl
ex
ity
1.
52
2.
53
3.
5
Lo
w
M
ed
iu
m
H
ig
h
Ex
te
rn
al
ity
Empathic Concern
Lo
w
 A
ttC
om
M
ed
 A
ttC
om
H
ig
h 
A
ttC
om
 
 
  45
R
el
at
io
n 
B
et
w
ee
n 
Ex
te
rn
al
ity
 a
nd
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 D
is
tre
ss
 a
t D
iff
er
en
t L
ev
el
s 
of
 
At
tri
bu
tio
na
l C
om
pl
ex
ity
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
Lo
w
M
ed
iu
m
H
ig
h
Ex
te
rn
al
ity
Personal Distress
Lo
w
 A
ttC
om
M
ed
 A
ttC
om
H
ig
h 
A
ttC
om
 
 
  46
R
el
at
io
n 
B
et
w
ee
n 
Fo
rg
iv
en
es
s 
an
d 
C
on
tro
lla
bi
lit
y 
at
 D
iff
er
en
t L
ev
el
s 
of
 
At
tri
bu
tio
na
l C
om
pl
ex
ity
2
2.
53
3.
5
Lo
w
M
ed
iu
m
H
ig
h
Co
nt
ro
lla
bi
lit
y
Forgiveness
Lo
w
 A
ttC
om
M
ed
 A
ttC
om
H
ig
h 
A
ttC
om
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  47
References 
Adams (1963). Towards an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal & Social 
Psychology, 67, 422-436. 
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The 
authoritarian personality. New York: Harper. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Bastian, B. & Haslam, N. (2005). Psychological essentialism and stereotype endorsement. 
Article in press. 
Batson, C. D. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social-psychological answer. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., Lishner, D. A., & Tsang, J. (2002). Empathy and altruism. In C. R. 
Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 485-498). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Griffitt, C. A., Barientos, S., Brandt, J. R., Sprengelmeyer, P., & 
Bayly, M. J. (1989). Negative-state relief and the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal 
of Personality and Social psychology, 56, 922-933. 
Batson, C. D., Duncan, B., Ackerman, P., Buckley, T., & Birch, K. (1981). Is empathic emotion 
a source of altruistic motivation? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 290-
302. 
  48
Batson, C. D., Dyck, J. L., Brandt, J. R., Batson, J. G., Powell, A. L., McMaster, M. R., & 
Griffitt, C. (1988). Five studies testing two new egoistic alternatives to the empathy-
altruism hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 55, 52-77. 
Batson, C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). Immorality from empathy-
induced altruism: When compassion and justice conflict. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 68, 1042-1054. 
Batson, C. D., Polycarpou, M. P., Harmon-Jones, E., Imhoff, H. J., Mitchener, E. C., Bednar, L. 
I., Klein, T. R., & Highberger, L. (1997). Empathy and attitudes: Can feeling for a 
member of a stigmatized group improve feelings toward the group? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 105-118. 
Batson, C. D., Turk, C. L., Shaw, L. L., & Klein, T. R. (1995). Information function of empathic 
emotion: Learning that we value the other’s welfare. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68, 1042-1054. 
Berry, J. W., Worthington, E. L., Parrott, L., O’Connor, L. E., & Wade, N. G. (2002). 
Dispositional forgivingness: Development and construct validity of the transgression 
narrative test of forgiveness (TNTF). Personality and Social psychology Bulletin, 27, 
1277-1290. 
Boon, S. D., & Sulsky, L. M. (1997). Attributions of blame and forgiveness in romantic 
relationships: A policy-capturing study. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 12, 
19-44. 
Buchanan, G. M., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1995). Explanatory style. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Cassell, E. J. (2002). Compassion. In C. R. Snyder, & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive 
psychology (pp. 434-445). New York: Oxford University Press. 
  49
Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and implicit theories of 
personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 19-30. 
Darby, B. W., & Schenkler, B. R. (1982). Children’s reactions to apologies. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 742-753. 
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. 
Catalogue of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10 MS, 2124, 85. 
Davis, M. H. (1996). Empathy: A social psychological approach. Boulder: Westview Press. 
DeJong, W. (1980). The stigma of obesity: The consequences of naïve assumptions concerning 
the causes of physical deviance. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 21, 75-87. 
Devine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and 
without compunction. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 60(6), 817-830. 
Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., Schroeder, D. A., & Penner, L. (2006). The social psychology of 
prosocial behavior. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dweck (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development. New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Dweck, C. S. & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social-cognitive approach to motivation and 
personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256-273. 
Eisenberg, N., & Fabes, R. A. (1990). Empathy: Conceptualization, measurement, and relation to 
prosocial behavior. Motivation and Emotion Special Issue: Empathy, 14, 131-149. 
Eisenberg, N., Guthrie, I. K., Cumberland, A., Murphy, B. C., Shepard, S. A., Zhou, Q., & 
Gustavo, C. (2002). Prosocial development in early adulthood: A longitudinal study. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 993-1006. 
  50
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related 
behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 91-119. 
Eisenberg, N., Wolchik, S. A., Goldberg, L., & Engel, I. (1991). Parental values, reinforcement, 
and young children’s prosocial behavior: A longitudinal study. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, 153, 19-36. 
Fincham, F. D., & Beach, S. R. H. (1999). Conflict in marriage: Implications for working with 
couples. Annual review of Psychology, 50, 47-77. 
Fiske, S. T. (2004). Social beings: A core motives approach to social psychology. New York: 
Wiley. 
Flethcer, G. J., Danilovics, P., Fernandez, G., Peterson, D., & Redder, G. D. (1986). 
Attributional complexity: An individual differences measure. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 51, 875-884. 
Fultz, J., Batson, C. D., Fortenbach, V. A., McCarthy, P. M., & Varney, L. L. (1986). Social 
evaluation and the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 50, 761-769. 
Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype 
expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78, 708-724. 
Gilbert, D. T. (1998). Ordinary personology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), 
The handbook of social psychology (pp. 89-150). Boston, MA: Mcgraw-Hill. 
Gill, M. J., & Andreychik, M. R. (2006). Yours is to reason why: Social explanations as a 
foundation of intergroup attitudes. Unpublished manuscript. 
  51
Gill, M. J., & Andreychik, M. R. (2007). Explanation and intergroup emotion: Social 
explanations as a foundation of prejudice-related compunction. Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations, 10, 87-106. 
Girard, M., & Mullet, E. (1997). Propensity to forgive in adolescents, young adults, older adults, 
and elderly people. Journal of Adult Development, 4, 209-220. 
Gopnik, A. (2000). Explanation as orgasm and the drive for causal knowledge: The function, 
evolution, and phenomenology of the theory formation system. In F. C.  
 Keil & R. A. Wilson (Eds.), Explanation and Cognition (pp. 299-323). Cambridge, MA, 
US: The MIT Press. 
Guimond, S., Begin, G., & Palmer, D. L. (1989). Education and causal attributions: The  
 development of "person-blame" and "system-blame" ideology. Social Psychology  
 Quarterly, 52(2), 126-140. 
Haslam, N., & Fiske, A. P. (1992). Implicit relationship prototypes: Investigating five theories of 
the cognitive organization of social relationships. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 28, 441-474. 
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2000). Essentialist beliefs about social categories. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 113-127. 
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2002). Are essentialistic beliefs associated with 
prejudice? British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 87-100. 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Hoffman, M. L. (2001). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
  52
Hoffman, C., & Hurst, N. (1990). Gender stereotypes: Perception or rationalization? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 197-208. 
Hong, Y., Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., Lin, D. M. S., & Wan, W. (1999). Implicit theories, 
attributions, and coping: A meaning system approach. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77, 588-599. 
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the 
production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1-27. 
Keller (2005). In genes we trust: The biological component of psychological essentialism and its 
 relationship to mechanisms of motivated social cognition. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 88, 686-702. 
Kelley, H. H. (1971). Attributions in social interactions. Morristown, NJ: General Learning 
Press. 
Kelley, H. H. (1972). Attribution theory in social interaction. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. 
H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valines, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the 
causes of behavior (pp. 1-26). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. 
Kestenbaum, R., Farber, E. A., & Stroufe, L. A. (1989). Individual differences in empathy 
among preschoolers: Relation to attachment history. New Directions in Child 
Development, 44, 51-64. 
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum 
Press. 
Lopez, G. E., Gurin, P., & Nagda, B. A. (1998). Education and understanding structural causes 
for group inequalities. Political Psychology, 19(2), 305-329. 
Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energy saving  
  53
 devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social  
 Psychology, 66(1), 36-47. 
Malle, B. F. (1999). How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 3, 23-48. 
Malle, B. F. (2004). How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social 
interaction. Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. 
Mauger, P. A., Perry, J. E., Freeman, T., Grove, D. C., McBride, A. G., & McKinney, K. E. 
(1992). The measurement of forgiveness: Preliminary research. Journal of Psychology 
and Christianity, 11, 170-180. 
McCullough, M. E. & Witvliet, C. V. (2002). The psychology of forgiveness. In C. R. Snyder, & 
S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 446-458). NewYork: Oxford 
University Press. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1985). Immediate and deferred imitation in fourteen- and twenty-four-month-
old infants. Child Development, 56, 62-72. 
Meltzoff , A. N., & Kuhl, P. K. (1989). Infants’ perception of faces and speech sounds: 
Challenges to developmental theory. In P. R. Zelazo, & R. G. Barr (Eds.), Challenges to 
developmental paradigms: Implications for theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 67-
91). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Nelson, M. K. (1993). A new theory of forgiveness. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Purdue 
University, West Lafayette, IN. 
O’Laughlin, M., & Malle, B. F. (2002). How people explain actions performed by groups and 
individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 33-48. 
  54
Piliavin, I. M., Rodin, J., & Piliavin, J. A. (1969). Good Samaritans: An underground 
phenomenon? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 289-299. 
Rackley, J. V. (1993). The relationships of marital satisfaction, forgiveness, and religiosity. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 
Blacksburg, VA. 
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution 
process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 10, 
pp. 173-220). New York: Academic Press. 
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view social  
 categories as natural kinds? In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language, interaction, 
and social cognition (pp. 11-36). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
Rushton, J. P., Fulker, D. W., Neale, M. C., Nias, D. K., & Eysenck, H. J. (1989). Ageing and 
the relation of aggression, altruism, and seertiveness scales to the Eysench Personality 
Questionnaire. Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 261-263. 
Sherif, M. (1966). The psychology of social norms. Oxford: Harper. 
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and 
oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Tangney, J. P., Fee, R., Reinsmith, C., Boone, A. L., & Lee, N. (1999, August). Assessing 
individual differences in the propensity to forgive. Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the American Psychological Association, Boston. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel 
& W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-
Hall. 
  55
Toi, M., & Batson, C. D. (1982). More evidence that empathy is a source of altruistic motivation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 281-292.  
Vescio, T. K., Sechrist, G. B., & Paolucci, M. P. (2003). Perspective taking and prejudice 
reduction: The mediational role of empathy arousal and situational attributions. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 455-472. 
Weiner, B. (1979). A theory of motivation for some classroom experiences. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 71, 3-25. 
Weiner, B. (1980a). A cognitive (attributional)-emotion-action model of motivated behavior: An 
analysis of judgments of help-giving. Journal of personality and Social psychology, 39, 
186-200. 
Weiner, B. (1983). Some methodological pitfalls in attribution research. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 75, 530-543. 
Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
Weiner, B. (2006). Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions: An attributional 
approach. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Weiner, B, Frieze, I. H., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., & Rosenbaum, R. M. (1971). Perceiving 
the causes of success and failure. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. 
Weiner, B., Graham, S., & Chandler, C. C. (1982). Pity, anger, and guilt: An attributional 
analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 226-232. 
White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. Psychological 
 Review, 66, 297-333. 
  56
Wrightsman, L. S. (1974). Assumptions about human nature: A social-psychological approach. 
Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Yzerbyt, V. Y. & Buidin, G. (1998). The impact of naïve 
theories about the nature of the groups on the accentuation effect. Unpublished raw data, 
Catholic University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.. 
Yzerbyt, V., & Rocher, S. (2002). Subjective essentialism and the emergence of stereotypes. In 
C. McGarty, V. Y. Yzerbyt & R. Spears (Eds.), Stereotypes as explanations: The 
formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups (pp. 38-66). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
  57
APPENDIX A—SOCIAL ORIENTATION MEASURES 
APROACHES TO SOCIAL RELATIONS (Punitive/Compassionate)  
 
Below are a series of opinions about strategies for managing certain types of 
social relations. Of course, because these are opinion statements, there are no 
“right” or “wrong” answers. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each statement using the scale below: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
              DISAGREE                                                                                           AGREE 
             STRONGLY                                                                                       STRONGLY 
 
 
 
____  (1) An eye for an eye seems like a proper approach to justice; people who do terrible deeds  
                should receive terrible punishments. 
 
____  (2) If someone causes harm to me, I often strive to cause harm to him or her in return. 
 
____  (3) In response to something as horrific as terrorism, anything short of a powerful military  
               response just doesn’t make sense to me. 
 
____  (4) Strong punishments send a strong message about bad behavior, and thus are a critical  
                tool for preventing bad behavior.  
 
____  (5) If we are too “soft” with bad people, they will fail to learn the right lesson.  
 
____  (6) An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind seems like a wise insight to me: As long  
                as people continue in a cycle of violence and retaliation, there is no end to human  
                suffering.  
 
____  (7) If someone causes harm to me, it is important to me to seek communication and  
                understanding, and to attempt reconciliation with that person.  
 
____  (8) In response to something as horrific as terrorism, we should not seek vengeance.  
                Rather, we should ask Why would people do such an unfathomable thing? and we  
                 should use our answers to that question to create programs and policies that will  
                 prevent future terrorism. 
 
____  (9) Love and compassion send a strong message to people, and anyone who experiences  
                these things will become a better person.  
 
____ (10) Even when a person does a terrible deed, if we respond compassionately he or she can  
                 be redeemed.  
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IRI 
 
Please fill-in-the-blank before each statement with the number that best indicates the extent to which 
the statement describes you. Please use the following scale: 
 
0-----------------1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4 
                   Does not describe                                                                         Describes me 
                           me well                                                                                     very well 
 
____  (1) I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
____  (2) I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
____  (3) I sometimes find it difficult to see things from “the other guy’s” point of view. 
____  (4) Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
____  (5) I get really involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 
____  (6) In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
____  (7) I am usually objective when I watch a play or movie, and I don’t often get completely   
               caught up in it. 
____  (8) I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
____  (9) When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them. 
____ (10) I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. 
____ (11) I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from  
                 their perspective. 
____ (12) Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. 
____ (13) When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 
____ (14) Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
____ (15) If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other  
                 people’s arguments.  
____ (16) After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. 
____ (17) Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
____ (18) When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them. 
____ (19) I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. 
____ (20) I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
____ (21) I believe there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
____ (22) I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
____ (23) When I watch a good movie, I can easily put myself in the place of a leading character. 
____ (24) I tend to lose control during emergencies. 
____ (25) When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while. 
____ (26) When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in   
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                 the story were happening to me. 
____ (27) When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
____ (28) Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
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FORGIVENESS 
 
Below are a number of situations in which people might find themselves. People respond in 
different ways to these situations in terms of what things they will forgive. We would like you to 
read each situation and imagine it has happened to you. Then, using the scale beneath each item, 
indicate how you think you would respond to the situation. 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) Someone you occasionally see in a class has a paper due at the end of the week. You have 
already completed the paper for the class and this person says he or she is under a lot of time 
pressure and asks you to lend him or her your paper for some ideas. You agree, and this person 
simply retypes the paper and hands it in. The professor recognizes the paper, calls both of you to 
her office, scolds you, and says you are lucky she doesn’t put you both on academic probation. 
Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive the person who 
borrowed your paper.  
 
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
 Definitely               Not likely to              Just as likely                 Likely to                 Definitely 
NOT forgive               forgive                      to forgive                     forgive                     forgive 
                                                                         as not 
 
 
(2) A fairly close friend tells you that he or she needs some extra money for an upcoming 
holiday. You know a married couple who needs a babysitter for their 3-year-old for a couple of 
nights and you recommend your friend. Your friend is grateful and takes the job. On the first 
night, the child gets out of bed and, while your friend has fallen asleep watching television, 
drinks cleaning fluid from beneath the kitchen sink. The child is taken by ambulance to the 
hospital and stays there for 2 days for observation and treatment. The married couple will not 
speak to you. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive your 
friend.  
 
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
 Definitely               Not likely to              Just as likely                 Likely to                 Definitely 
NOT forgive               forgive                      to forgive                     forgive                     forgive 
                                                                         as not 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(3) A friend offers to drop off a job application for you at the post office by the deadline for 
submission. A week later, you get a letter from the potential employer saying that your 
application could not be considered because it was postmarked after the deadline and they had a 
very strict policy about this. Your friend said that he or she met an old friend, went to lunch, and 
lost track of time. When he or she remembered the package, it was close to closing time at the 
post office and he or she  would have to have rushed frantically to get there; he or she decided 
that deadlines usually aren’t that strictly enforced so he or she waited until the next morning to 
deliver the package. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive 
your friend for not delivering the application on time.  
 
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
 Definitely               Not likely to              Just as likely                 Likely to                 Definitely 
NOT forgive               forgive                      to forgive                     forgive                     forgive 
                                                                         as not 
 
(4) You just started a new job and it turns out that a classmate from high school works there, too. 
You think this is great; now you don’t feel like such a stranger. Even though the classmate 
wasn’t part of your crowd, there’s at least a face you recognize. You two hit it off right away and 
talk about old times. A few weeks later, you are having lunch in the cafeteria and you overhear 
several of your coworkers, who do not realize you are nearby, talking about you and laughing; 
one even sounds snide and hostile toward you. You discover that your old classmate has told 
them about something you did back in high school that you are deeply ashamed of and did not 
want anyone to know about. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to 
forgive your old classmate for telling others your secret.  
 
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
 Definitely               Not likely to              Just as likely                 Likely to                 Definitely 
NOT forgive               forgive                      to forgive                     forgive                     forgive 
                                                                         as not 
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(5) A distant cousin you haven’t seen since childhood calls you one day and asks if he can stay 
with you while he looks for work and an apartment. You say it will be fine. He asks you to pick 
him up from the bus station that night and you do so. Your cousin is just like you fondly 
remember him; you reminisce for several hours. The next morning you give him some advice on 
job and apartment hunting in the area, then you go about your own business. That night you 
come home and witness an angry argument in front of your residence between your cousin and a 
neighbor. Your cousin is obviously very drunk, cursing, and out of control. You ask what’s 
happening and without really taking the time to recognize you, your cousin throws a bottle at 
you, cutting the side of your head. The police arrive, and with some scuffling, take your cousin 
away and take you to the emergency room where you have stiches put on your cut. The next 
afternoon, your cousin calls from the police station. He says he is really sorry about the whole 
scene and that it was not like him but he was upset about being turned down for three jobs that 
day. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive your cousin.  
 
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
 Definitely               Not likely to              Just as likely                 Likely to                 Definitely 
NOT forgive               forgive                      to forgive                     forgive                     forgive 
                                                                         as not 
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PREFERENCE FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
 
The world consists of many different social groups. Some group memberships are based on 
nationality (e.g., U.S., Egypt, Japan, Ireland), some are based on ethnicity or culture (e.g., 
Hispanic, African American, European), and so on. Below, you will find several general 
descriptions of the manner in which groups might relate to each other. Then, you will be asked 
for your personal opinion of each of those styles of relating. Please give your opinion on the 
scales provided. 
 
 
RELATION STYLE #1: Every social group takes a “one for all and all for one” approach 
toward the other social groups. Each group feels that “what’s ours is yours” and that what 
happens to other groups is as important as what happens to one’s own group. If one group 
needed help, other groups would help, and all groups would be willing to do this for each 
other. Every group would give the other groups “the shirts off their backs.” Groups would 
willingly share resources such as food, wealth, knowledge, and so on.  
 
                                                                                               NO                                        YES 
Would you like social groups to relate in this manner?          1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Does this sound like an ideal of intergroup relations 
that appeals to you?                                                                 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
 
Would you be happy if society functioned in this way?         1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Would this form of intergroup relations be difficult and 
stressful for you?                                                                     1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
 
RELATION STYLE #2: Certain social groups tend to “call the shots” and take initiative 
and the others tend to follow along. These “leader” groups make most of the decisions and 
the other groups go along with those decisions. The groups in charge usually get their way, 
and take responsibility for things. The other groups are followers and back the leaders, 
knowing that they can depend on those leaders to lead and protect them when it’s needed. 
 
                                                                                               NO                                        YES 
Would you like social groups to relate in this manner?          1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Does this sound like an ideal of intergroup relations 
that appeals to you?                                                                 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
 
Would you be happy if society functioned in this way?         1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Would this form of intergroup relations be difficult and 
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stressful for you?                                                                     1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
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RELATION STYLE #3: Group relations are structured on an even basis. The groups feel 
like they are pretty equal in the things they do for each other. If one group does something 
for another, the recipient will try to do the same thing in return at some point in the future. 
If groups are dividing something up, they would tend to split it into even shares. Groups 
take turns leading, making decisions, and so on. To keep things balanced, the groups keep 
track of favors and obligations among them. All groups get irritated if they feel that one 
group is taking more than it is giving. What all groups want is equal treatment and equal 
shares. 
 
                                                                                               NO                                        YES 
Would you like social groups to relate in this manner?          1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Does this sound like an ideal of intergroup relations 
that appeals to you?                                                                 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
 
Would you be happy if society functioned in this way?         1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Would this form of intergroup relations be difficult and 
stressful for you?                                                                     1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
 
RELATION STYLE #4: Social groups interact with each other in a purely rational, 
business-like way, focusing on “getting their money’s worth.” Each feels like it should get 
“a fair rate of return” on whatever it provides for others. How much each group gets out of 
its relationship with others depends on how much it puts in. So each group keeps track of 
the ratio of its “costs” (in terms of money, time, effort, aggravation, etc.) in relation to its 
“benefits.” Intergroup relations basically come down to practical matters like these. When 
it comes down to it, each group chooses to contribute to others whenever doing so is 
profitable. 
 
                                                                                               NO                                        YES 
Would you like social groups to relate in this manner?          1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Does this sound like an ideal of intergroup relations 
that appeals to you?                                                                 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
 
Would you be happy if society functioned in this way?         1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
 
Would this form of intergroup relations be difficult and 
stressful for you?                                                                     1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 
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PHILOSOPHIES OF HUMAN NATURE 
 
This questionnaire is a series of attitude statements. Each represents a commonly held opinion, 
and there are no right or wrong answers. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree by filling-in-the-blank next to each statement. Please use the following scale: 
 
1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5-----------------6 
  Agree                   Agree                   Agree                DISagree            DISagree         DISagree 
 Strongly            Somewhat             Slightly                 Slightly            Somewhat         Strongly 
 
____  (1) If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure that they would not be seen,  
               they would do it.  
 
____  (2) Most people have the courage of their convictions. 
 
____  (3) The average person is conceited.  
 
____  (4) Most people try to apply the Golden Rule, even in today’s complex society.  
 
____  (5) Most people would stop and help a person whose car was disabled. 
 
____  (6) The typical student will cheat on a test when everybody else does, even though he has a set of  
                ethical standards.  
 
____  (7) Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help someone in trouble. 
 
____  (8) Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it. 
 
____  (9) It’s pathetic to see an unselfish person in today’s world, because so many people take advantage  
                of him.  
 
____ (10) “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is a motto that most people follow. 
 
____ (11) People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, but few people  
                stick to them when the chips are down.  
 
____ (12) Most people will speak out for what they believe in. 
 
____ (13) People pretend to care more about one another than they really do. 
 
____ (14) People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better off lying. 
 
____ (15) Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people. 
 
____ (16) Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had the chance.  
 
____ (17) The average person will stick to his opinion is he thinks he’s right, even if others disagree. 
 
____ (18) Most people will act as “Good Samaritans” if given the opportunity. 
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____ (19) Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they’re just afraid of getting caught.  
 
____ (20) The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others. 
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ATTRIBUTIONAL COMPLEXITY 
 
This questionnaire has been designed to investigate the different ways that people think about 
themselves and other people. There are no “right” or” wrong” answers. We are interested in 
your own perceptions.  Please answer each question as honestly and accurately as you can, but 
don't spend too much time thinking about each answer. Please use the following scale:  
 
1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7 
                  Strongly                                                                                            Strongly 
                  Disagree                                                                                             Agree  
 
_____ 1. I don’t usually bother to analyze and explain people’s behavior.  
 
_____ 2. Once I have figured out a single cause for a person’s behavior I don’t usually go any   
              further.  
 
_____ 3. I believe it is important to analyze and understand our own thinking processes.  
 
_____ 4. I think a lot about the influence that I have on people’s behavior.  
 
_____ 5. I have found that relationships between a person’s attitudes, beliefs, and character traits  
               are usually simple and straightforward.  
 
_____ 6. If I see people behaving in a really strange or unusual manner, I usually put it down to  
              the fact that they are strange or unusual people and don’t bother to explain it any further.  
 
_____ 7. I have thought a lot about the family background and personal history of people who 
    are close to me, in order to understand why they are the sort of people they are.  
 
_____ 8. I don’t enjoy getting into discussions where the causes for people’s behavior are being  
               talked about.  
 
_____ 9. I have found that the causes for people’s behavior are usually complex rather than  
               simple.  
 
_____ 10. I am very interested in understanding how my own thinking works when I make  
                 judgments about people or attach causes to their behavior.  
 
_____ 11. I think very little about the different ways that people influence each other.  
 
_____ 12. To understand a person’s personality/behavior I have found it is important to know  
                 how that person’s attitudes, beliefs, and character traits fit together.  
 
_____ 13. When I try to explain other people’s behavior I concentrate on the other person and  
                 don’t worry too much about all the existing external factors that might be affecting  
                 them.  
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_____ 14. I have often found that the basic cause for a person’s behavior is located far back in  
                time.  
 
_____ 15. I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes for people’s behavior.  
 
_____ 16. I usually find that complicated explanations for people’s behavior are confusing rather  
                than helpful.  
 
_____ 17. I give little thought to how my thinking works in the process of understanding  or  
                 explaining people’s behavior.  
 
_____ 18. I think very little about the influence that other people have on my behavior.  
 
_____ 19. I have thought a lot about the way that different parts of my personality influence 
      other parts (e.g., beliefs affecting attitudes or attitudes affecting character traits).  
 
_____ 20. I think a lot about the influence that society has on other people.  
 
_____ 21. When I analyze a person’s behavior I often find the causes form a chain that goes back  
                 in time, sometimes for years.  
 
_____ 22. I am not really curious about human behavior.  
 
_____ 23. I prefer simple rather than complex explanations for people’s behavior.  
 
_____ 24. When the reasons I give for my own behavior are different from someone else’s, this  
                 often makes me think about the thinking processes that lead to my explanations.  
 
_____ 25. I believe that to understand a person you need to understand the people who that  
                 person has close contact with.  
 
_____ 26. I tend to take people’s behavior at face value and not worry about the inner causes for  
                 their behavior (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, etc.).  
 
_____ 27. I think a lot about the influence that society has on my behavior and personality.  
 
_____ 28. I have thought very little about my own family background and personal history in  
                 order to understand why I am the sort of person I am.  
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NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item below by filling-in-the-
blank preceding the item with a number from the following scale: 
 
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4------------------5-----------------6 
         Strongly                                                                                                             Strongly 
         Disagree                                                                                                               Agree 
 
____  (1) I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success. 
____  (2) Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a  
               different opinion.  
____  (3) I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 
____  (4) I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
____  (5) I like to have friends who are unpredictable. 
____  (6) I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
____  (7) When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to  
                expect.  
____  (8) I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my  
                life. 
____  (9) I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in  a group believes. 
____ (10) I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
____ (11) I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what to expect from it. 
____ (12) When I go shopping, I have difficultly deciding exactly what it is that I want. 
____ (13) When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly. 
____ (14) When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 
____ (15) I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment.  
____ (16) I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently. 
____ (17) I would describe myself as indecisive. 
____ (18) I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment. 
____ (19) I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might  
                 happen. 
____ (20) My personal space is usually messy and disorganized. 
____ (21) In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong. 
____ (22) I tend to struggle with most decisions. 
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1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4------------------5-----------------6 
         Strongly                                                                                                             Strongly 
         Disagree                                                                                                               Agree 
 
____ (23) I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important  
                 characteristics of a good student.  
____ (24) When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be  
                  right. 
____ (25) I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
____ (26) I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them. 
____ (27) I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and  
                 requirements.  
____ (28) When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as  
                 possible.  
____ (29)  I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
____ (30) I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things. 
____ (31) It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind. 
____ (32) I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
____ (33) I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
____ (34) I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from mine.  
____ (35) I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
____ (36) I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention is unclear to me. 
____ (37) When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it’s  
                 confusing. 
____ (38) I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 
____ (39) I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 
____ (40) I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
____ (41) I dislike unpredictable situations. 
____ (42) I dislike the routine aspects or my work (or studies).  
 
 
  74
APPENDIX B—VIGNETTES 
 
Individual/Positive 
 
PEACE: Corrigan Mairead was awarded the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize for her work with the Peace 
People Organization, an interdenominational movement dedicated to ending the deadly violence 
between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. How would you explain the behavior of 
Corrigan Mairead? That is, what are the causes or reasons that led her to work so hard to end 
violence? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
PEACE/PROGRESSIVE ACTIVISM: Jeanette Rankin, the first woman to serve in the U.S. 
Congress, was a dedicated activist, working for both women’s right to vote and laws to protect 
children from harsh work environments. A vehement pacifist, Rankin cast the only 
Congressional vote against declaring war on the Japanese after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In 
1968, she led the Jeanette Rankin Brigade to Washington to protest the Vietnam War. How 
would you explain the behavior of Jeanette Rankin? That is, what are the causes or reasons for 
her activism and pacifism? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying 
explanation.  
 
PROSOCIAL: Alain Locke, an accomplished writer, educator, and philosopher, was the first 
Black Rhodes Scholar, studying at Oxford, and receiving his Ph.D from Harvard. As head of the 
Philosophy Department at Howard University, Locke developed the philosophy of ‘cultural 
pluralism’, which emphasized the value of respect for individuality as the most important guide 
of human conduct. How would you explain the behavior of Alain Locke? That is, what are the 
causes or reasons underlying his creation of the philosophy of cultural pluralism? Say as much 
as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
PROSOCIAL: Joseph Plesh achieved success as a businessman sufficient to enable his early 
retirement to a comfortable existence near the beautiful beaches of northwest Florida. Following 
his retirement, however, he was not content simply to relish his material success. Rather, he 
began working as a volunteer doing tax work for the poor, helping to ensure that they paid no 
more taxes than absolutely necessary and received refunds that they often did not know they 
were entitled to. How would you explain the behavior of Joseph Plesh? That is, what are the 
causes or reasons underlying his volunteerism? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide 
a satisfying explanation.  
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Individual/Negative 
 
CRIMINALITY: Robert Stone has been in and out of prison since he was 14. While he has not 
been involved in any ‘violent’ crimes, he has been arrested multiple times for offences such as 
burglary, robbery, and disorderly conduct. How would you explain the behavior of Robert 
Stone? That is, what are the causes or reasons underlying his criminality? Say as much as you 
feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM: Missy Gooding was devoted to becoming a great artist. She 
had a very difficult time, however, dealing with criticism. She would often become enraged if 
someone said something negative—even if it were potentially constructive criticism—about her 
work. On one occasion, she invited a famous artist to her studio to review her work. When the 
famous artist told her that she needed to work on a couple of technical issues, she began 
screaming and cursing at him! How would you explain the behavior of Missy Gooding? That is, 
what are the causes or reasons underlying her reactions to criticism? Say as much as you feel is 
necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
VIOLENCE/REPRESSION: Augusto Pinochet became the president of Chile in 1973 after 
violently overthrowing the government of then president Salvador Allende. Pinochet relied on 
mass arrests of people who disagreed with him as well as political assassinations, of which there 
were at least 2000, to keep his regime in power. His regime became internationally know for 
their “disappearances”: Individuals who challenged his power would simply disappear and often 
were never found or heard from again. How would you explain the behavior of Pinochet? That 
is, what are the causes or reasons underlying his violent and repressive leadership style? Say as 
much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
ANTI-SOCIAL TENDENCIES: Joseph Cotton is a difficult person. He has contempt for other 
people and their ideas, so he seizes every possible opportunity to belittle people and what they 
think. He controls people using his fierce temper: People are afraid he’ll explode so they take 
special care not to offend him or oppose him. He rarely shows interest or concern about other 
people. How would you explain the behavior of Joseph Cotton? That is, what are the causes or 
reasons underlying his negative attitudes and behaviors toward others? Say as much as you feel 
is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
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Group/Positive 
 
PROSOCIAL: The Illinois Indian tribe of the Midwestern United States believed strongly in the 
ideal of egalitarianism. The Illinois culture was based on sharing power and resources among all 
tribe members, with no one able to grab an excessively large share of these things. In fact, even 
though they did choose a Chief to keep order in the tribe, the Chief did not get a much larger 
share of resources than did other members of the tribe. How would you explain the behavior of 
the Illinois Indian tribe? That is, what are the causes or reasons underlying their egalitarian 
tendencies? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
ADVANCEMENT: The Mayans were one of the most advanced societies of classic Middle 
America. They developed astronomy, a 365 day calendar (as opposed to the less accurate lunar 
calendar), and they were the only Middle American society to develop a system of writing. Also 
impressive were their architectural feats, accomplished without the use of the wheel, draft 
animals, or metal tools. How would you explain the behavior of the Mayans? That is, what are 
the causes or reasons underlying their ability to make so many important advances? Say as much 
as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
PEACE: When conflict erupts among the Batek people of Malaysia they try to resolve it through 
informal discussions rather than through power assertion or violence. If threatened by 
neighboring tribes or societies with violence, the Batek flee rather than fight if no peaceful 
resolution can be achieved. How would you explain the behavior the Batek? That is, what are the 
causes or reasons underlying their tendency toward peaceful conflict resolution and the 
avoidance of violence? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
 
COMPASSION/SELF-SACRIFICE: The Buddhist monks and nuns of Vietnam strongly sought 
to prevent and then end the war there between the United States and the Vietnamese communists. 
Some monks went so far as to douse themselves in gasoline and publicly burn themselves to 
death to convey their view that war is a senseless atrocity. Others devoted themselves to caring 
for the wounded, whether those wounded were U.S. soldiers, Vietnamese soldiers, or 
Vietnamese civilians. They continued to do this even as many of them were executed by both 
sides for suspected “collaboration with the enemy.” How would you explain the behavior of 
these Buddhist monks and nuns? That is, what are the causes or reasons underlying their 
readiness to sacrifice their own lives to prevent or end the war? Say as much as you feel is 
necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
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Group/Negative 
 
VIOLENCE/AGGRESSION: Ancient Sparta was a society based on militarism, taking young 
boys from their families and educating them in the arts of war. Sparta emphasized above all else 
the greatness of sacrificing one’s life in battle for the state. How would you explain the behavior 
of Ancient Sparta? That is, what are the causes or reasons underlying their glorification of 
violence and death? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying explanation.  
  
VIOLENCE/AGGRESSION: A highly important aspect of Yanomomi culture is aggression.  
The Yanomomi are constantly at war with one another, and much of their everyday social life is 
concerned with forming alliances with friendly groups and waging war against hostile groups. 
How would you explain the behavior of the Yanomomi? That is, what are the causes or reasons 
underlying their aggressive tendencies? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a 
satisfying explanation.  
  
ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: The Silány are a ‘secret society’ in Hungary. Their initiation 
rituals are characterized by humiliation of new members. They are a very exclusive group and 
treat non-members with scorn and derision. How would you explain the behavior of the Silány? 
That is, what are the causes or reasons underlying their humiliation of their new members and 
their scorn for outsiders? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying 
explanation.  
 
VIOLENCE/FEARFULNESS: Within the U.S., there is a social movement combining religious 
fundamentalism and violent ideology. Members of this movement believe that the end of the 
world is near. They believe that the end will be preceded by a fierce battle, which many of them 
suspect will be between themselves and some element of the U.S. military/law enforcement 
apparatus. Accordingly, they live with high levels of fear and anxiety, and they stockpile massive 
arsenals of guns and explosives. How would you explain the behavior of these 
fundamentalists/militarists? That is, what are the causes or reasons underlying their belief 
system of fear and violence? Say as much as you feel is necessary to provide a satisfying 
explanation.  
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APPENDIX C—CODING INSTRUCTIONS 
Psychologists have found that, when people explain others’ behavior, their explanations vary 
along a dimension labeled CONTROLLABILITY (among other dimensions). The basic idea is 
that when people explain others’ behavior, they sometimes view behavior as caused by a factor 
that is under the control of someone—a controllable cause. In other cases, they view a behavior 
as caused by a factor that is outside of anyone’s control—an uncontrollable cause. This 
dimension of people’s reasoning is conceived of as a continuum with uncontrollable causal 
factors at one end and controllable causal factors at the other.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
To help you understand, here are some examples of uncontrollable explanations: 
(a) PERSONAL TRAITS or ABILITIES: “She isn’t very smart”;  
      “he’s not athletic”; “he’s physically unattractive”; “she’s Black” 
(b) ELEMENTS OF THE CONTEXT/SITUATION: “there are lousy schools in 
that neighborhood”; “he had a high fever”; “it was very hot”; “the recession” 
**In sum, if an explanation makes mention of factors that are outside of anyone’s control 
(i.e., ability, economic forces, luck), code that explanation as uncontrollable.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Here are some examples of controllable explanations: 
(a) LEVELS OF EFFORT or OPINIONS/BELIEFS: “she never studies”; “he 
thinks abortion is immoral”; “they just didn’t care” 
(b) ELEMENTS OF THE CONTEXT/SITUATION: “he joined the fraternity”; 
“the teacher is biased”; “her friends didn’t help her” 
**In sum, if the explanation makes mention of factors that are within the control of 
someone (i.e. effort, hiring decisions, prejudicial attitudes, religious beliefs), code that 
explanations as controllable. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
NOTE: “Controllable” causes are causes that are controllable by anyone, not just the individual 
in question. For example, “the teacher was biased” and “he didn’t study for the test” are both 
controllable causes (the teacher could presumably choose to be unbiased, and the student could 
choose to study harder). The same holds for uncontrollable causes. 
 
NOTE: In some cases, you will need to “read between the lines,” trying to figure out what the 
writer is implying rather than stating plainly. Do your best! 
 
NOTE: You will make your ratings on a continuum. So, you can and should make distinctions 
among degrees of controllability. For example, “she never studies” is somewhat more 
controllable than “she has a difficult time studying.” Likewise, “he wasn’t prepared for the 
interview” is more controllable than “he was very fatigued.”  
 
NOTE: You can see above that intrinsic causes can be either controllable or uncontrollable, and 
extrinsic causes can be either controllable or uncontrollable.  
 
NOTE: Two explanations can refer to the same causal factor, yet one can refer to that factor as 
controllable and another to that factor as uncontrollable: For example, the statement “he lives in 
a bad neighborhood” can be either uncontrollable (i.e. he has no choice regarding where he lives) 
or controllable (i.e. if he doesn’t like it there, he can move!). 
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Psychologists have found that, when people explain others’ behavior, their explanations vary 
along a dimension labeled STABILITY (among other dimensions). The basic idea is that when 
people explain others’ behavior, they sometimes view behavior as caused by a factor that is 
relatively enduring over time—a stable cause. In other cases, they view a behavior as caused by 
a factor that lasts for only a brief duration of time—an unstable cause. This dimension of 
people’s reasoning is conceived of as a continuum with unstable causal factors at one end and 
stable causal factors at the other.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
To help you understand, here are some examples of stable explanations: 
(a) PERSONAL TRAITS or ABILITIES: “she’s just that kind of person”;  
      “she’s outgoing”; “she’s smart”; “she has an attitude problem”; “she’s   
       lazy”; “she’s naturally talented at drawing”  
(b) FIXED ELEMENTS OF THE CONTEXT/SITUATION    
ASSOCIATED WITH THE BEHAVIOR: “physics is just really hard major”; 
“his  family is just impossible to get along with”; “it’s always cold there”; 
“she lives in a bad neighborhood” 
**In sum, if an explanation makes mention of factors that are relatively constant over 
time (i.e., ability, enduring personality traits, fixed aspects of a person’s 
situation/context), code that explanation as stable.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Here are some examples of unstable explanations: 
(a) TRANSITORY, SHORT-LIVED “STATES” OF A PERSON: “she 
       was in a really bad mood”; “he unexpectedly flew off the handle,   
       that’s not his usual tendency”; “I guess she was confused” 
(b) TRANSIENT ELEMENTS OF THE CONTEXT/SITUATION  
      ASSOCIATED WITH THE BEHAVIOR: “it was too loud in the dorm   
      last night”; “she had a lot of things due all at the same time”;  
      “someone had vandalized her car”; “her boyfriend had acted like a jerk” 
**In sum, if the explanation makes mention of factors that tend to fluctuate from moment 
to moment or day to day (i.e., effort, mood, luck, temporary situational factors), code that 
explanation as unstable. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
NOTE: In some cases, you will need to “read between the lines,” trying to figure out what the 
writer is implying rather than stating plainly. Do your best!  
 
NOTE: You will make your ratings on a continuum. So, you can and should make distinctions 
among degrees of stability. For example, “she is intelligent” is somewhat more stable than “she 
likes college.” Likewise, “his family has never been supportive” is more stable than “graduate 
school is stressful.”  
 
NOTE: You can see above that intrinsic causes can be either stable or unstable, and extrinsic 
causes can be either stable or unstable.  
 
NOTE: Two explanations can refer to the same causal factor, yet one can refer to that factor as 
stable and another to that factor as unstable: For example, “she’s a lazy person” is stable, 
whereas “she was lazy when it came to that class” is unstable.” 
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Psychologists have found that, when people explain others’ behavior, their explanations vary 
along a dimension labeled INTERNALITY/EXTERNALITY (among other dimensions). The 
basic idea is that when people explain others’ behavior, they sometimes view behavior as caused 
by a factor that lies within that individual—an internal cause. In other cases, they view a 
behavior as caused by a factor that lies outside of the individual—an external cause. This 
dimension of people’s reasoning is conceived of as a continuum with internal causal factors at 
one end and external causal factors at the other.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
To help you understand, here are some examples of internal explanations: 
(a) PERSONAL TRAITS, ABILITIES, or ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS: 
“She isn’t very smart”; “he’s not athletic”; “they never put forth any effort” 
** In sum, if an explanation makes mention of some trait or quality inside the person as 
having caused the behavior, code that explanation as internal. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Here are some examples of external explanations: 
 (b) ELEMENTS OF THE CONTEXT/SITUATION or SOCIAL FORCES: “She 
was getting her tooth pulled”; “he had just won the lottery”; “they were out 
celebrating their victory”; “his family is very poor”; “she goes to a terrible 
high school”  
**In sum, if an explanation makes mention of some factor that is outside the person, code 
that explanation as external. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
NOTE: An external cause implies that most people would behave in the same way under similar 
circumstances. For example, if someone says “she was crying because her husband just died,” 
this implies that she is merely reacting to a situation in the manner most people would react. That 
is, does not possess a uniquely strong tendency to cry. 
 
NOTE: An internal cause implies that the cause of a behavior was something relatively unique 
about the person who performed the behavior. For example, “she failed the test because she is 
just dumb,” describes the cause of her failure as lying in her unusually high degree of 
“dumbness.” Likewise, “he’s always getting into fights,” describes an individual who is 
unusually aggressive or fight-prone. 
 
NOTE: You are not offering your explanation for why a person performed a behavior, but are 
rather characterizing the explanation that the writer offered. For example, “he turned to crime 
because he had to feed his family,” is an external explanation in the eyes of the writer. It does 
not5 matter whether you think this is an acceptable external reason for his criminal behavior. 
 
NOTE: In some cases, you will need to “read between the lines,” trying to figure out what the 
writer is implying rather than stating plainly. Do your best! 
 
NOTE: You will make your ratings on a continuum. So, you can and should make distinctions 
among degrees of internality/externality in the person’s total explanation. For example, “he said 
it because he is a cruel person,” is more internal than “he does have a tendency to be obnoxious 
sometimes, but, on the other hand, he was in a hurry and maybe didn’t have time to think about 
what he was saying.” 
